Posts Tagged ‘austrian economics’

Ludwig von Mises on the Economics of Human Action

November 15, 2012
Ludwig von Mises

Ludwig von Mises (Photo credit:

Let’s see if Ludwig von Mises can help us clarify some common issues that confuse people who are not very literate in matters of economic and finance:

English: Cover of the scholar's edition of Hum...

English: Cover of the scholar’s edition of Human Action by Ludwig von Mises (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

“In the book Human Action, I present a new approach to understanding
economic activity in terms of actual action. Selling and buying, production
and extortion and war, borrowing and lending- these are all just human
actions.”

“When most people use terms like speculation, inflation, and deflation,
they speak of these matters like they speak of the weather- something that
just happens to them. That is absolutely inaccurate. Speculating is
something that people do. The inflating and deflating of credit markets
involves many instances of human action.”
“These action are measurable in terms of things like prices. Do we say that
the temperature reading on a thermometer has caused the weather to become
hot or cold? No, we recognize that the thermometer simply measures existing
developments. Likewise, there are many measures, such as prices, which can
be used to measure the human actions of inflating or deflating a credit
market.”

“When people borrow, that is inflationary. If someone starts a business on
borrowed money (or with any other borrowed assets such as borrowed land or
borrowed equipment), then the entrepeneur owes interest on the amount they
borrowed. Of course, that promise of future transaction does not increase
the amount of currency in circulation, but that legal promise to pay a debt
in the future does increase the total amount of outstanding credit (as in
A/R or Accounts Receivable). That is inflationary.”

English: Cover of 2010 print An Introduction t...

English: Cover of 2010 print An Introduction to Austrian Economics by Thomas C. Taylor (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

“Likewise, when a government borrows money, they also promise future payments of interest. Governments sometimes fail to make the payments they promise, but governments are typically considered better credit risks than most private businesses because governments have the power to impose taxes or even invade other territories in order to obtain the assets to cover their past promises. Government promises for future action typically do correspond to actual increases in the amount of currency in circulation, but not always. Further, when governments approve a budget of future spending, that is not a promise to pay (as in the case of an actual government bond), but just the authorization of a possible future activity.”

“So what actions correspond to deflation? The deflating of a credit market (a speculative bubble of credit) can happen in a few ways. When the US Confederacy ceased to function, what happened to all of the promises of future activity that they had made? Sensible people simply recognized that the promises of a defunct government are quite worthless.

Deflation is a correction of the accounting of the valuation of the financial claim (the asset) so as to reflect a revised expectation of a lower repayment amount (or none at all). Consider that when a debtor dies insolvent, there is no recourse for the creditors. They know that they will never be repaid the debts they claim. They revise their accounting to reflect a contraction in their Accounts Receivable. They deflate or reduce their own credit accountings.

A credit bubble is contracted when the accountants record the junk debt as being junk debt. This revision in the accounting is certainly not what makes the debt in to junk, but is just the re-assessment or re-appraisal of a newly estimated realistic market value of the old debt (the Accounts Receivable). So, the human actions that correspond to the deflating of credit markets include foreclosures and bankruptcies as well as the discounted settlements on debt, such as the case in Chapter 13 bankruptcies.”

English: Jean-Paul Rodrigue's stages (or phase...

“Speculative bubbles always deflate eventually. Many speculators do not know they are basically gambling. The mere mention of possible risk inherent in their speculating may result in hysterical ridicule of the basic ideas of Austrian Economics. Their speculation tends to be irrational, panicked, and greedy (based on something other than personal productivity, but just based on the idea of future resale of their so-called store of value).”
“A business owner who RATIONALLY speculates about possible future profit by forging silver in to silverware (to sell rather than for their own use) knows in advance that there is risk in their enterprise (and may even
calculate specific risk factors). We could still call their activity speculation, but it is not pure speculation. It is productivity (forming the silver in to silverware) along with speculation. In contrast, if a retailer simply buys some existing silverware from a manufacturer or wholesaler for later possible resale, that is closer to pure speculation.”
That is from Chapter 9: “Why All Libertarians are silly, naive, terrified geniuses”

(Unless I just made all of that up).
http://www.linkedin.com/groupItem?view=&gid=40850&type=member&item=60544299&commentID=104571101


Mises' Human Action

 

 

English: Cover of the scholar's edition of Hum...

English: Cover of the scholar’s edition of Human Action by Ludwig von Mises (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

 

 

first harmony then prosperity

August 9, 2011
Harmony internally, then prosperity externally

Yes, “there is more to life than money.” Also important, “a fool and his money are soon parted.”

So be aware of the possibility of being foolish about wealth. Be aware of the possibility of being foolish about all of life or any of it. Then be aware of the possibility of being calm and clear and courageous about life, including the aspect of life regarding wealth.
Lately, many people are talking about financial risk and results that they have called surprising. Many of them have been investing their trust in mass media or massive bureaucracies like the insurance company AIG or the Federal Reserve or the government of the USSR– you thought I was going to say US, didn’t you?
What have been the consequences of investing trust in the mass media and massive bureaucracies? Have those results (perhaps such as being unpleasantly surprised) raised the question as to whether those methods might have been foolish? Is it possible that foolish methods of investing trust may produce the result of financial losses, rather like the saying goes that “a fool and his money are soon parted?”
What about discounting the importance of financial realities? Are finances suddenly important to you or were they always important and only recently recognized as important? How about this: are gasoline or electricity suddenly important to you or were they always important and only recently recognized as important because we could take them for granted until prices reached a point that we altered our perspective and our behavior based on things like rising gasoline prices.
For many years, I have been focusing on the possibility of rising fuel prices and their consequences on the economies of Japan, the USSR, Europe, and the US. My publication in 2004 of “the Real US Deficit: OIL” featured a section called “the DominOIL effect” relating to why I expected fuel prices to continue their dramatic rise that began in 1999 and what consequences I expected in the US, which I expected to be similar to what had been happening in Japan since 1989 and the UK and EU since 1999.
The next chart shows the all-time low of inflation-adjusted prices of gasoline in the US in 1999. Global oil prices also made a major low in 1999.
The last chart is a chart of the stock market of the UK. Next, here is what gas prices in the US were near the time of that article in 2004:
My central question (in this 2004 publication: www.gold-eagle.com/editorials_04/fibonacci110704.html) was “how many dollars will it cost to buy a gallon of gasoline next year?” Here is an 8-year chart of what happened:
(from here: http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=rbob-gasoline&months=120)
Some people have questioned my logic because of oil and gasoline prices falling sharply in 2008.  However, for those that have the courage to read my old articles, I did not say that demand for fuel would never drop or that prices would never drop.
On the contrary, I simply said that diminishing supplies (since the easily predictable peaking of global oil production in 2006) would raise prices enough to slow down the global economy, including that of the US. That predictable slowing of economic activity would predictably reduce demand for fuel, which would predictably drop prices. The drop in 2008 does not disprove the accuracy of the logic, but establish it. I may have even published all of that content, but it is pretty easy to see the logic one’s self if one is willing and able to face the simple facts.
How can the global economy expand after the 2006 peak in oil production? It must contract. Economic activity drops as fuel supply drops. Things like currency inflation or credit deflation are secondary financial measures relative to a primary tangible economic issue like an empty fuel tank in your car. Having lots of cash or credit but being out of gas in the middle of a desolate highway do not make a fool into a genius. Primary functional economic tangibles like gasoline and food are the things that we value having currency to access. No one cares much about currency (or gold) when they are starving, right?
So, it was the spiking of fuel prices by 2007 that were accompanied by the steep decline of global stock prices in 2008. After stocks began to plummet, fuel prices did too eventually- all as I predicted. Further, real estate borrowing had predictably diminished considerably as well, so real estate prices predictably declined dramatically, which resulted in financial trouble for many financial institutions, such as FNMA, AIG, and WaMu, as I specifically predicted in a video that has been online since 2006. (I can send a link to those interested.)
Once fuel prices fell, the global stock market began to recover. However, gasoline prices in the US recently approached their 2008 highs again (in red below).

In 2007, stocks peaked while gasoline (and silver) rose. Then silver peaked next in early 2008), then gasoline. Doesn’t that imply that rising fuel prices may have been the cause of the decline in prices of stocks (in the US and globally) and even of silver? Or maybe it was the high silver prices that brought down everything, right? 😉
When gasoline prices in the US reached a high enough level in April to reverse the spending behavior of the US economy, dropping demand enough to reduce purchases and bring down gasoline prices. However, that reduction in a fundamental behavior within the US economy also brought down the prices of the US stock market (blue above) and even of silver (green above).
In fact, those three things peaked on the exact same day: April 29th, 2011 (close-up shown below). But no one could have predicted that rising gasoline prices would have in any way effected the US economy or spending habits or stock prices or even silver prices, right? Rising fuel prices could not really have any effect on popping bubbles of speculative mania, would they?


Then again, maybe the cause was President Bush or President Obama, not gasoline prices. Or maybe they are personally responsible for gasoline prices- like maybe whether the prices of gasoline rise or fall is totally dependent on the choices of exactly one person.
But why did the Japanese economy slow down in 1989? Why did European economies begin to slow in 1999? Did $11 gallons of diesel in the UK in 2008 have any effect on the spending behaviors and economic activities of business and consumers within the UK?
Possible? Yes.
Predictable? Yes!
So, what is coming next? More selling of stocks and real estate. I’ve been warning of that since before 2004. I knew that the speculative bubbles would not last forever and were nearing their extremes. Real estate began peaking in 2005 (in places like Phoenix) and soon extended to most of the US (and much of Europe etc).  Stocks began peaking in the US in 2007 (at least for most sectors, excluding high tech, which peaked several years prior).
Of course there were a few exceptions, like the US stock sector HUI (shown above). However, the mining stocks of HUI are part of the same economy, too. They actually peaked in early April this year (pink):
What has done well? Here are a few examples of gains approaching 100% gains in the last 10 days:
What else did well lately? I sold a put option for $1.07 today that closed Friday at $.17. That change (up over 400%) is a pretty decent increase for a single day, right?
But remember, the mass media and massive bureaucracies may indicate that there is no such thing as predictability, or at least not in certain instances. Even notice that as you are reading this sentence, there is absolutely no way to predict that this sentence is going to end with a punctuation mark, is there?
No one could have predicted any of this. The future is completely unrelated to the past- not just your personal future, but even the future of how this sentence is going to end.
Nature does not have any patterns in it. And that, as always, is entirely the fault of the US President. Or the Federal Reserve. Or OPEC. Or this sentence.
So how are we going to fix the problem of nature not having any predictable patterns in it? First, let’s blame someone else because that has always worked marvelously in the past, right? Then let’s wait for the person that we blame to save us from them. Finally, let’s complain about how waiting for them to save us from them is still not working again as usual as always.
Just do not adjust. After all, adjusting could effect your actual results, and no one is interested in financial security or economic prosperity because that would be evil and shameful and of no functional relevance whatsoever. So, is any of this fooling you?
Keep in mind that sometimes translations can shift the implication of a message. If someone were to suggest that proudly foolish naivete about financial speculative bubbles was a major risk, deserving great caution, do you think that message might be translated like this: “proud attachment to ideals about wealth is dangerous” or even “the love of money is the root of all evil?”
It’s not ignorance that is most risky. It is believing that something is so when in fact it is not.
From an emotional or irrational attachment to false presumptions, blame and anger and grief and agonizing and proud argumentativeness and shame all may arise predictably. Learn that, either the easy way or the hard way, but learn it fast.
By the way, yesterday at the close of trading (Monday 8/8/2011), I purchased some call options on the US Stock market. Those positions rise in value when stock prices rise. After one of the biggest down days in US stocks in decades, I understood that the panic of the masses after the weekend downgrade of US debt could be a short-term buy signal for US stocks.
So, after stock futures dropped another 2% in overnight trading, they then reversed 4% and are again pushing toward an open of more than 2% up. That should produce overnight gains of well over 100% for those instruments.
UPDATE:
I sold those call options for a gain of only 40% overnight. But that was just the start of the day. It got better…..

“negativity” about when gas prices will be 65 cents again

August 7, 2011

Let’s start with an analogy. Then, I will tell you about when gas will be 65 cents per gallon again and when the US economy will recover. Okay?

Do you know how much the speed limit is for a school zone? Many school zones have speed limits around 25 miles per hour, but they can even be as low as 15. Imagine, however, that someone was driving through a school zone at about 50 miles per hour. This was during school hours, but there all that happened in this case was that the driver hit a speed bump pretty hard and was startled to notice that there was a bump there and only then noticed that the speed limit was 25.

Now, I do not know how many of you know any 84 year-old women. However, some 84 year-old women do not like the idea of speed bumps. Some of them say things like “I am concerned that this speed bump could damage my car.”

I might say, “the speed bumps are not likely to damage your car if you drive over them at 15 miles per hour instead of, for instance, 50 miles per hour.” She might say, “yeah, but I do not appreciate those people trying to damage my car like that. It’s just not right!”

So, this is how I found out about the 50 mile per hour race through the school zone and her startling discovery of a speed bump right there in the middle of the school zone. I said to her “wow, you know that driving 50 miles per hour over a speed bump can damage your car, right?”

She said, “Yes, but I do not appreciate your negativity about the subject. Think positive.”

I said, “I am thinking positive. I am thinking that because you like to stay out of jail, then you can observe the speed limit, especially in the school zones, and make sure to slow down before you drive over those speed bumps. It’s just not safe to drive that fast in a school zone.”

“So what you are saying is that should I buckle my seat belt? You always say that and it is so annoying!” she said.

“Didn’t you have it on?” I replied.

“No, I don’t like how they feel. You know that the strap just bothers my neck,” She said.

So, that is sometimes how conversations go. People may categorize as negative something that they would prefer to dismiss.

Categorizing something as negative- other than a negative number or a negative ion– can actually be a process of dismissing it or negating it. The so-called negativity of a recommendation to slow down before driving over a speed bump is not inherent in the recommendation or the speed bump. The label of negativity implies a contrast between positive reinforcement or encouragement and negative reinforcement or discouragement.

Now let’s talk about gas prices. Gas prices used to be 65 cents in the United States. That was many decades ago, but many people remember when prices were around 65 cents or even lower.

Imagine that someone asked in 1980, “when are gas prices in the US going to recover to their prior level of 65 cents?” I might say, “never.” They might say, “do not be so negative. Think positive!”

Next, imagine that someone asked in 1990, when are gas prices in the US going to recover to their prior level of 65 cents? I might say, “never.” Again they might say, “do not be so negative. Think positive!”

In the year 2000 or 2010 or 2020 or 2030, someone might keep asking me when gas prices will recover to their prior levels. I may keep answering the same answer. They may keep dismissing my answer as negative.

Next, let’s talk about stock market prices in Japan. We could be talking about real estate prices in Japan, but let’s talk about stock market prices in Japan.

In 1990, someone might have asked when are stock prices in Japan going to recover to their 1989 high. Someone might answer, “they might not ever recover to that level.” That might be called “negative,” right?

In 2000, someone might have asked again when are stock prices in Japan going to recover to their 1989 high. Someone might answer again, “they might not ever recover to that level.” That still might be called “negative,” right?

In 2010 or 2020 or 2030, someone might continue to ask when will the Japanese economy recover, when will stock prices recover, or when will real estate prices recover. The answer may still be “maybe never.” That answer still may be dismissed as negative.

Consider that one factor in the Japanese economy is the cost of fuel, which was recently over 7 dollars per gallon when priced in US Dollars. As fuel prices rose there, that effected the spending and borrowing behaviors of businesses and individuals. Their economy slowed down, kind of like an 84 year-old woman who was already startled by a speed bump the last time that she drove through that particular school zone. High fuel prices were like a speed bump interrupting the prior economic patterns from when gasoline was 65 cents a gallon.

In 2008, prices of diesel briefly exceeded $11 per gallon in the UK. As fuel prices rose since 1999, the economy of the UK hit a speed bump. People bought less stocks and sold more stocks. Stock prices came down since 1999. Real estate prices came down, too.

Many people asked when would the UK recover. Other people said “maybe never.” Some people dismissed that answer as negative.

(UK stock market prices 1984-2011):

Now, let’s talk about a few price forecasts. In 2004, I published a forecast of rising prices for fuel worldwide and a series of predictable consequences on prices of other things, such as US real estate and US stocks.

These forecasts were based in part on the observation of prior developments such as in Japan or the UK. Even moreso, these forecasts were also based on reports from oil geologists going back to the 1950s.

I first published a warning about a decline in US real estate prices in 2003. I saw the change in lending behavior (in credit markets) and deduced the eventual consequences of it. At the time, I did not connect the change in lending behavior to the change in fuel prices. That was in 2004.

Many people have called my forecasts “negative.” In fact, my forecasts of a drop in price in various markets were forecasts of negative price change for those markets. My forecasts for rising prices for oil and gasoline (when that was my current forecast at the time) were forecasts of positive percent increases as in rising price change.

In my 2003 publication, I featured a US stock sector that was doing much better than the rest of the US stock market at that time. By 2010, the stock prices of that group of US stocks was up over 1600%. That would be a positive change in price. Prices of other things decreased or changed at a negative rate. Some forecasts are negative and some are positive.

Right now, I also forecast that driving over speed bumps at 50 miles per hour can damage a car. We could call that a forecast of a negative consequence. It is not positive thinking to talk about how driving over a speed bump can damage a car. Positive thinking would be something else entirely, like thinking positively of driving 25 miles per hour in a school zone while actually driving 50 miles per hour in a school zone.

So, when will the economy of Japan recover to what it was when gas was 65 cents per gallon? It might not. When will driving over a speed bump at 50 miles per hour be safe? It might not.

“Yeah, but when is someone going to remove that horrible speed bump from that annoying school zone?” They might. However, now the speed bump is there.

“Yeah, but when will gasoline be 65 cents per gallon again?” It might. However, it isn’t that now. It is something else.

In fact, gasoline prices are not the same everywhere. We mentioned that gas prices in Japan and the UK were higher than some other places. There is a table of prices here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gasoline_and_diesel_usage_and_pricing

For instance, in Saudi Arabia or Iran or Libya, gasoline prices have recently been about 65 cents per gallon (with prices converted to US Dollars). Those places have a lot of oil and not so much demand from cars. You can imagine how people in Japan or the UK feel about gasoline prices that are less than ten percent of what the Japanese and British pay in those places with high demand for auto fuel and little or no crude oil.

In Venezuela, gas prices have been about 10 cents per gallon for many years (with prices converted to US Dollars). Again, you can probably imagine how jealous the people in Arabia or Libya feel about gas prices of only 10 cents per gallon.

Someone recently asked me “when are prices of gasoline going to be 10 cents again in Saudi Arabia? They are all the way up to 65 cents per gallon now- isn’t that just horrible?” Can you guess what I told them?

Naturally, what I told them is that gasoline prices will only recover after people stop driving 50 miles per hour over speed bumps. Further, US economic growth will not recover to come close to what it was when gasoline here was 65 cents per gallon unless it does. It might. It might not. It hasn’t yet.

It is interesting to note that, in Kuwait, the net trade surplus from oil is over $33,000 per year per person. That is an unusually large transfer of wealth from other nations to that one, like for an infant who happens to be born there.

My forecast continues to be that oil-rich regions like Alaska, Arabia, and Alberta will continue to experience profound economic growth relative to places like the UK or Japan or Nevada. I might be wrong, though. After all, the Soviet Union dissolved even though it was one of the most oil-rich regions of the planet (but not per capita- just overall).

Eventually, one of my forecasts will probably be wrong- even inevitably. So far though, there has been a distinctively positive correlation between my forecasts and actual developments. Many other people have made alternate forecasts based on such methodologies as “positive thinking” and “hope for change” and “irrational exuberance,” but there has been a negative correlation between their declared forecasts and the actual reality that emerged.

Now, I have a few more questions for you. If a person has $50,000 of cash and then they make a new promise to pay $500,000 on a mortgage, then how much additional cash do they have after making that new promise and spending $5,000 as a down payment on their real estate speculation? Did you notice that the question itself reveals a lack of comprehension of the subject matter?

Next, if an insurance company has $50 million dollars and then they make new promises to pay up to $500 million dollars in policy claims, then how much additional cash do they have after making all those new promises and spending $5 million in paying out prior debts? Again, did you notice that the question itself reveals a lack of comprehension of the subject matter?

If a bunch of naive stock market speculators pour millions of dollars in to trading the stocks of various companies, such as AIG (pictured above) how much does that increase the profitability of those companies? In other words, how much does it increase net profits of a company when investors buy and sell stocks of a company? It doesn’t.

Similarly, when investors buy and sell stocks of other companies, driving up those share prices, does that really have any lasting effect on the tangible book value of other companies who also own sharing of, for instance, Enron or AIG or FNMA? How do fluctuations in the market pricing of the stocks for a company filing bankruptcy effect the debt to asset ratio of the company (their solvency)? It doesn’t.

To compute the book value of one thing off of the market pricing and recent comps of another thing is one method of computing a book value figure. However, to do so reflects some fundamental presumptions about prices, the stability of prices, and, in particular, the risk of the sudden deflating of credit bubbles (as in bubbles of legally valid promises for future performance which may or may not actually occur in the future as promised).

I assert that most people are not related realistically to the reality of prices (or speculative bubble of credit promises). For instance, they may not be related to the reality of how gasoline prices vary from place to place and from time to time. They may even call such variations in pricing unpredictable or incomprehensible or horrible or negative or unfair.

Similarly, most people may not be related to a realistic future cash value of their insurance policies or their real estate or their stocks. They may be surprised by future variations in pricing.

Accountants may know the term “Tangible Book Value Per Share.”
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/TBVPS.asp

That is a computation of the value of a business based in large part on current assessed value of current assets. Some companies may have a negative “book value,” such as insurance companies who regularly make promises far in excess of their current capacity to pay.

Again, those computations are based on current assessments, including current assessed value of their stock holdings in other companies and current assessed value of their real estate holdings. But that is a problem. “Book values” are being computed based on other assessed values (current market pricing), not on other “book values.”

Accountants may also recognize other ratios such as Price to Book Value. That means a ratio of the difference between the market pricing or assessed value and the book value, which is computed off of other market pricing or assess values. Again, do you notice the irony in this?

How much additional cash does an insurance company have after making new promises totaling $500 million in debt? They might not have any new cash based on taking on new debt.

How much additional cash does a real estate borrower have after making new promises totaling $500,000 in debt? They might not have any new cash based on taking on new debt.

Finally, how much additional tangible book value does a company have if the market pricing of it’s own assets rises by 100%? If those assets with rising market prices are just inflated real estate mortgage contracts or inflated stock prices or inflated promises from insurance policies, there might not be any new tangible value in that company.

New promises do not in themselves produce new tangible value. New debts do not equal new net profits.

Call this comment negative if you like, but going 50 miles per hour does not remove the speed bump from the road ahead or convert the school zone into an abandoned highway. Consider also that there is an immense opportunity present, but it is not available by presuming first that prices never change, and second that when they do, those changes are totally unpredictable.



www.OneEyedKingsWealthClub.com

promoting economic prudence

September 7, 2010

this video is a spontaneous summary of the below commentary:

Taxing of land ownership could encourage stewardship rather than hoarding. Taxing of land ownership (rather than taxing of spending and profit) could have the effect of encouraging private owners of land, especially of unused land, to either use the land productively or to sell it to others who may be willing and able to use it profitably.

Instead of investing in owning as much land as possible (concentrated hoarding), people might favor investing in using land as well as possible. Rather than simply hoarding land and even facing penalties for improving or developing it, land owners could be given an incentive to invest in the use of the land. That incentive corresponds to a reduction in the taxes on productivity, (income taxes) including the economic productivity possible with a certain portion of land.

Recently, revenues from income taxes have been plummeting in many parts of the world. I was one of many forecasters who anticipated the economic shift underway as well as the implications on government revenues worldwide and the likely reactions of governments to the predictable developments, which many governments apparently failed to predict.

Also predictably, taxes on spending (sales taxes) have also been generating decreasing revenues. Rather than penalizing people for productivity or spending, perhaps the decision-makers now have the will to try something rather radical: to tax the hoarding of unused land. Since the amount of land does not fluctuate, tax revenues could be forecast with precision as distinct from when taxing productivity (income) or spending (sales).

By imposing penalties (taxes) on spending and productivity, governments are also favoring the hoarding of unused real estate by those already wealthy. The wealthiest landowners do not need to earn additional income, as they can spend out of hoarded savings. While purchases are penalized by rates such as 5% (sales tax) and productivity is penalized by rates such as 38% (income tax), there is no similar penalty of the hoarding of unused land- just a tiny tax proportionately. There is also no penalty on hoarding wealth, but indeed that is given tax favoritism with income tax deductions for IRAs and 401Ks and so on.

In other words, the US currently has a tax structure that disproportionately favors the hoarding of unused land and savings, while penalizing spending (with sales taxes) and severely penalizing economic productivity (with income taxes). The penalizing of all spending and especially prudence (profitable activity) would predictably produce a severe instability in a nation’s economy.

Penalizing spending reduces spending. Rewarding hoarding encourages hoarding. With current economic conditions, to reward hoarding and penalize spending (especially profitable investment) seems not just negligent but malicious or even suicidal. However, that is the system we are inheriting. That is the system that the baby boomers have supported. It may have been wonderful in many ways. However, it may no longer be viable.

Penalizing prudence and profit reduces socio-economic mobility. Favoring hoarding discourages economic activity in favor of complacence.

Government spending is not economic stimulus. Government spending just means that spending that would have been done privately is being taken from private decision-makers and being implemented by bureaucrats.

For those who favor economic stimulus, private spending must be encouraged. Hoarding must be penalized- or at least not specifically rewarded as with current tax structures. How could the government stimulate economic productivity? First, reduce or eliminate rewards for hoarding of unproductive assets and then remove or reduce penalties for foreign and domestic investment (income taxes). By increasingly taxing the ownership of land, prudent stewardship of the land would be promoted.

Note that many people focus on how various governments spend money. I am not ignoring that subject, but simply focusing for the moment on what stimulates economic activity and what penalizes it. Different governments (local, federal, and so on) can adjust their spending in accord with the values and priorities specific to the various places and circumstances.

As a competent economic forecaster witnessing a variety of inaccurate and even illogical forecasts and promises, I simply note that penalizing economic productivity never stimulates economic productivity. The anti-productivity and pro-hoarding tax system currently popular in much of the industrialized world will either continue to stifle economic productivity or that productivity-penalizing system will be discontinued, slowly or suddenly.

Rather than penalizing spending (and the profits that result from prudent spending), why not reduce or remove the penalties against some or all spending? Why not penalize hoarding or at least remove tax advantages for those who hoard?

To me, this is not a moral issue. This is a very simple practical issue.

Governments and people who are willing to encourage stewardship and prudent investment will predictably attract economic activity away from governments and people who penalize stewardship and prudent investing. In a time when many governments are facing bankruptcy and motivated to do whatever it takes to attract lenders to buy new bonds from them, perhaps investors will direct their financial support to any government that promises secure tax revenues by rewarding prudent investing and responsible stewardship of the land within their jurisdiction.

above average intelligence

June 30, 2010

I’m presenting a very broad presentation about the emerging shift in economics and finance. I’ll start with a few simple definitions, and just these definitions may already be quite distinctive and insightful to you, even though you may already know all of this. You may have never thought of it this way, though….

Economics is the study of human behavior in regard to prioritizing different activities (basically, possible uses of one’s time). Finance is just a system of measuring economic patterns of behavior using prices (as in counting or accounting).

More specifically, economics addresses questions of priority: like what outcome to target first, what next, then what after that… as well as what methods to use and who will do what (and when/by when). Thus, economics is a primary realm of activity for housewives, farmers, breeders, choir directors and pirate captains as well as merchants and bureaucrats.

Finance may address questions of how to actually produce the priority results, and is particularly focused on counting the costs, including of time, involved in doing any particular thing. Finance tends to be a tool for comparing various methods to use to accomplish a selected outcome, but also informs which outcome to value as a priority.

Accounting is the field of activity in which people may focus most on time (like when a debt is due) and one very rudimentary form of accounting is taking inventory as in the counting of raw materials in stock, while finance is the specific type of accounting particularly concerned with prices and cash flow. At least that is how I will be using those terms.

Summary:

Economics addresses questions of why, what, who, when and how. Almost everyone explores those questions and more or less continuously.

Accounting and finance are tools used to inform choices regarding who, when and, in particular, how. Not everyone uses accounting or finance to explore those questions, or perhaps only occasionally.

There is one big distinction about finances as distinct from all of the rest of economics. Finances involves voluntary exchange.

Economics can involve all forms of piracy as well as hurricanes and earthquakes and bombs damaging infrastructure and interrupting plans. Farmers may deal with practical issues of soil chemistry, weather, transportation, insects, pollution, animals, thieves, war, natural disaster, employee management, as well as market prices.

Market prices are the only element of economics that involves voluntary exchange. Finance, as I use the term, is about the voluntary aspect of economics, including barter. That is actually a rather small part of economics, but it can be an important part, at least occasionally.

So, prices, generally speaking, refer to an actual agreement of a buyer and a seller to voluntarily exchange one thing for one or more other things. When two agree on an exchange rate between the two things to be exchanged and then actually exchange them, that exchange rate for a real transaction is called a price.

Of course, price can also refer to an offer to sell (like the asking price of a home that has not sold for 6 months, perhaps by a seller who may not be particularly motivated to produce an actual transaction) or a bid (like an offer to do a certain job or to buy an item at an open auction, which is basically what a stock market is: an open auction in which people buy and sell shares of ownership of private companies). Note that prices of actual transactions are generally much more relevant than recent prices of similar investments (AKA “comps“) or than “outlying” bid prices or ask prices. By outlying prices, I mean prices that lay outside the range of actual market activity- so far from the actual value to qualified buyers or sellers that the outlying offers may go weeks or months without producing any actual transaction or agreement.

Note further that there can be a lot of “involuntary” influences on prices. There may be extensive interventions beyond the voluntary realm and into the realm of mafia rackets and other forms of government. Note that any coercive activity to influence the behavior of other people involuntarily is what I mean by the term “government,” so thugs and warlords and the mafia and even churches may all fit within my definition of a governing operation.

If any system persistently influences or governs human behavior, especially involuntarily or coercively or deceptively, that is a form of governing AKA government. All forms of advertising and commercial media thus are also within my definition of government.

Free markets” evidence patterns of voluntary exchange (buying and selling as well as borrowing and lending). Governments, as I define them, have the singular purpose of coercively influencing, inhibiting and redirecting the voluntary exchange of individuals and groups. Governments manipulate economic behavior with methods ranging from subsidies to prohibitive taxes, or from licensure requirements to criminal penalties for marketing or even just possessing certain materials, such as censored books or nuclear weapons or psychedelic plants.

Note that to many people, governments are no more heroic or villainous than the weather or soil chemistry. Government is just another reality to be considered in economic questions of priority results and methods. Obviously, a relatively small number of people form and direct governments to influence the behavior of other people.

In other words, this is the conspiracy theory of government, which is that all government is conspiracy (though a conspiracy that is as conspicuous and overt as any conspiracy could be). Of course, given that most private businesses also have trade secrets or exclusive copyrights and patents (and thus set up governments to protect the interests of those private businesses), it is equally true to say that all business is conspiracy and government is just the business of coercion, as distinct from retail businesses that target voluntary exchange.

So, commercial advertising, while designed to influence behavior, is not nearly as coercive as foreign militaries and the occupying forces of law enforcement. While there is clearly a spectrum of variations, there is really no clear distinction between what is a legitimate government of organized coercion and any other system of human activity. However, governments universally publicize claims of the legitimacy of their organized violence. Perhaps that is ultimately the only distinction: the open claims to legitimacy.

Withdrawing from such potentially challenging or even controversial questions about coercion and claims about legitimate coercions, let’s focus on voluntary exchange.

Voluntary exchange is the primary behavior that is of interest in the realms of finances. Again. the primary purpose of governments is to systematically interfere with voluntary exchange. Economic behavior includes voluntary exchange, but also includes any other way of acquiring or accessing or even just claiming something, as well as all sorts of non-financial things like building a house, repairing a house, tearing down a house, or even just composing this essay.

Even the gathering of twigs into a nest by a bird could be considered an economic activity. While the organized violence of governments is inherently economic, so is most everything else, including the organizing of a choir or orchestra or the creating of a work of visual art. Economics is simply doing anything “on purpose” – that is, consciously or with awareness, as in pre-meditated. Even if I spontaneously create two pieces of artwork, the choice to display one or both or neither is an economic choice.

So, all of that was background to clarify common misconceptions as preparation for the following. Now, I’m going to compare three broad categories of economic value. Here are three broad categories that people may value differently at different times:

1) raw materials (things like oil, food, cotton fabric, and bricks)

2) human ingenuity, technology, and voluntary exchange (the value of other people in general)

3) governments which openly and systematically take things by force (the value of the organized violence of law enforcement and militaries)

I’m proposing that global commodity prices reflect the voluntary and spontaneous human valuations of various raw materials. That is uncontroversial. I’m also proposing that global stock market prices reflect the voluntary and spontaneous human valuations of private commercial business based on voluntary consent. Again, that is not especially controversial.

We can compare price valuations of commodities and stocks and presume that those prices tell us something about the voluntary and spontaneous behavior and preferences of humans worldwide in relative to the priority they give to raw materials relative to the ownership of private businesses in general. Of course, the fluctuating valuations of certain businesses may be distinctive, such as AIG or Microsoft (United States) or Sony (Japan) or BMW (Germany), just as are the fluctuating valuations of a few tangible materials, such as oil or gold or sugar or paper (or the most famous original ingredient of Coca-Cola: cocaine).

Again, none of that is especially controversial. What I have never before directly stated, at least not in a published format like this, is that government bond markets may reflect the voluntary and spontaneous human valuations of the priority value of operations of organized violence.

To be quite direct, governments collect debts with the use of force. That is a primary function of the court systems of modern governments: the systematic collection of debts using force. That includes foreclosures, garnishments, levies and repossessions as well as evictions and bankruptcies.

What people may be saying when they choose to direct their investments toward government bonds instead of raw materials or the ownership of private businesses is that the investors value the promises of government to use force, including to involuntarily collect debts and repay claims of debt ruled to be valid by that governing operation, over the prospects of human voluntary exchange (ownership of commercial businesses through stock markets) or the value of tangible materials. In other words, people who are investing in government bonds want accountability and practical security, not more stuff or more ideas.

Ideas are the business of businesses. Sometimes people want more of that. Stuff is always valuable, too, but sometimes people want more protection for whatever they already have- more armed security- not more stuff. When people are investing their trust not in more ideas and not in more stuff but in more organized violence, they may voluntarily and spontaneously choose to buy more government bonds.

Yes, these patterns may also correspond to baby boomers retiring and ballooning the population of elderly people who systematically liquidate their pensions and sell their stocks to pay for their retirement, favoring the bonds of the governments that they perceive to be most stable… over the much less stable investments of stock markets (and who want young and healthy people to provide for them with the intervention of coercive governments through taxation). However, an awareness of such demographic trends is optional. The fluctuating valuations of price charts are clear enough, and anyone with access to the internet can confirm the relevant data.

So, I’m proposing the above interpretations on the following information. I’m reporting to you that there has obviously been a major shift in the overall values of humanity in the last 10 or 11 years. I’m also proposing that it is clearly evident in the following chart:

That is a chart of the last 11 years of prices for a bundle of commodities priced in US Dollars (in blue), the red Dow Jones Index of global stock market prices (not to be confused with the more popular but much less comprehensive Dow Jones Industrial Average of 30 leading US companies), and the green line of yields (interest rates for the lending of money to the US Treasury for 30 year periods, also known as “buying government savings bonds“).

Obviously, the most remarkable thing about that chart is the huge surge in the US Dollar prices of commodities from 1999 to 2008, followed by the sharp drop in 8 months from 10942 to 3105, a decline of about 72%. (People worldwide wanted a lot more stuff, then basically changed their minds abruptly and dramatically.) Here is a close-up of the last few years of that Commodity Index:

Note that the 8-month rebound which peaked in October 2009 only recovered about 21% of the losses of the prior 8 month period. In other words, there are now two clear pieces of evidence that we may have seen the end of the prior multi-year trend of increasing demand for raw materials in general. First was the historic collapse in commodities prices, and second was the weak rebound.

Since October 2009, prices have twice approached the prior high (see yellow highlights below). After faltering from the shelf or plateau in April 2010 (the yellow line), prices fell in May to approach the level of several prior reversals (blue line with four reversals in purple). So far, the subsequent rebound across June 2010 has been quite small and may have already ended.

Next, let’s look at global stock prices compared to that same price index for commodities:

You may notice that the prices of stocks and commodities generally have moved in the same direction. In 2001, they came down together. In 2003-2005, they went up together, and did so again in 2007. In 2008, they came down together. In 2009, they went up together. Note the arrows below showing the periods of consistent price movement.

However, many of the times that both price lines reversed, the reversals were preceded by an obvious divergence (that is, one price index reversed before the other). Note the orange marks below showing periods of diverging trends, when global commodity prices and global stock prices moved in opposite directions.

Those are the divergences that are easy to see. Not so easy to see on the above chart is the following brief divergence.

In early 2009, global commodity prices rose in late February while global stock prices continued down for a few more weeks. That was a signal to me to look for a rebound in stock prices. (Note that I publicly forecast most of the reversals shown above and, for those interested, I can document that.)

Further, note again that the commodity index topped in October of 2009, months before stocks, but now both are dropping together. There was a period of divergence, perhaps marking a destabilizing of the prior trend, and then stocks, which had been continuing the prior trend of rising prices beyond October 2009 into early 2010, then joined the downward trend of commodities.

Again, these price charts are simply measurements of the voluntary behavioral valuations (buying and selling) of investors worldwide. In summary of the chart above, we can conclude that global investors across the last 10 or eleven years were relatively stable in their behavior and valuation regarding the publicly-traded stock share ownership of private businesses. I say relative in regard to their behavior and valuation in relation to commodities, which favored commodities over stocks from 2002 through 2005 as well as 2007 and much of 2008.

However, as of late 2008, global investors not only dramatically decreased their valuation of global stocks, but decreased their valuation of raw materials even faster. In 2009, global investors continue to relatively favor stocks over commodities (as they had during 2008 when commodity prices plummeted 72% while stock prices fell only 59 percent). In 2009, the rebound in stocks was a 59% reversal of the prior decline of 59%(!), while commodities rebounded only 21% and that rebound lasted only 8 months, while stocks continued rebounding. (Top to bottom was 320 to 130, a change of 190, with a rebound of 112 points: 59%)

I’m going to briefly devote some time now to the geometric pattern of the above chart. Look at what geometric patterns you can notice by yourself before going to the next page.

What I have highlighted above is two double zigzags (separated by another shorter double zigzag). Since the latter part of the second zigzag is about the same size as the first zigzag, we could count these as two zigzags or as three.

Note that the rebound also forms a triple zigzag with momentum clearly declining as of late 2009, highlighted below:

By declining momentum, I simply mean that the slope of the line of rising prices is steepest in the early part of the rebound. Further, each of the three segments of the rebound is smaller than the one before, which is another sign of decreasing momentum.

Now, having looked at the prices of commodities and stocks (representing the relative priority of stuff and ideas), let’s look closely at the most stable of the three lines from the first chart: the interest rate (yield) of long-term US Treasury bonds. Again, consider that this line may represent the perceived valuation of organized violence (though a declining interest rate means an increasing confidence in the organized violence of the US Treasury to collect debts from it’s underwriters, which is the US citizenry including private businesses, and repay it’s lenders, which are the people who lend money to the US Treasury by purchasing bonds, which are just written promises to repay a loan.)

Here is the most obvious thing I see when I look at this chart, a steady trend (see blue line below) of declining interest rates:

Again, looking at the geometric patterns, I see two double zigzags (note that this chart is for 11 years).

Again, they are also divided by a double zigzag in the middle (ending at the second touch to the blue line), plus the first zigzag (of 1999 – 2005) can be further subdivided into more double zigzags:

Finally, the last year or so has formed another double zigzag (and this chart also highlights the double zigzag in 2006 and 2007):

In other words, there are a lot of double zigzags showing up in these charts, as well as occasional oddities such as the blue trendline above. While some people might speculate that these zigzag patterns (or the three peaks that form a straight line) are somehow random, consider that they simply reflect clear trends in human behavior and valuation, that is, the priority that people give to various alternatives. These trends sometimes form waves and they sometimes form straight lines.

In other words, they might not be random at all. They might be an orderly transition forming over a period of time.

I propose that the last 11 years has clearly evidenced a global shift toward human investors voluntarily prioritizing of the operations of organized violence, organized coercion, organized force, an organizing of the involuntary transfer of affluence and influence. While there have been continuing increases in demand for stuff and for ideas, the demand for action (or for a certain type of action in particular) has been increasing rather steadily in zigzags of fluctuation across the last 11 years.

Further, as of 2007, the demand for ideas has dropped. In 2008, the declining demand for stuff joined and surpassed the declining demand for ideas. Now, we are ripe for an accelerated shift in demand away from stuff and ideas toward action (or a certain type of action in particular).

I first published forecasts of the shift of the last several years in early 2003, and detailed the precise sequence of events in later years. The “capitulation phase” has already begun. Soon, even those most resistant to acknowledging what is developing will admit that investors worldwide have demonstrated the shift in their priorities. They have demonstrated that shift in priorities or values through their behavior, including of buying and selling as well as of borrowing and lending.

Consider, last, that none of these conclusions are actually at all controversial. Of course, history will let us know one way or the other.

Change equals opportunity. Are you willing to experience all change as opportunity?

Note that certain private businesses may not decrease in demand. Are you willing to be part of the exception?

By the way, not everyone can be above average. Are you willing to be above average anyway?

change equals opportunity

June 17, 2010

Change equals opportunity

 

(2010, June 17th)

 

Virgina Satir

Virgina Satir (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

 

“Life is not what it’s supposed to be. Its what it is. The way you cope with it is what makes the difference.” Virginia Satir (1916-1988)

 

Note that the video has extensive extra content (and context!). Also, the video falls behind the audio, so you may prefer to just listen while you scroll down and read along.

 



Humanity is in the midst of immense changes. What immense changes am I thinking of? I think of the long-term advancement of technology from boats to cars and planes as well as from the telegraph to radio and satellite to the internet. However, we are also in the midst of sudden short-term change, like the destabilizing of global lending markets and even vast changes in the governing organizations that define and enforce property rights (AKA “legal” ownership). When those governing operations of organized violence clash with each other or simply dissolve, people may be reminded quickly of appreciating what they may have been taking for granted.

 

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New patterns of behavior are emerging quickly, including a return to certain patterns that some people may have discounted as obsolete. New questions are being asked and explored, and that learning involves new information which informs new models.

 

There is also a huge shift in demographics worldwide. The wealth of the retiring generation of baby boomers of the industrialized nations is quickly being distributed more widely to the relatively poor and young populations of developing nations, especially in Asia, including many Muslims.

 

This is called a crisis by mainstream news and politicians, as the huge imbalance in price of real estate and businesses (stocks) in the industrialized world drop toward the average prices in the majority of the world. The disproportionate affluence of certain nations is diminishing rapidly, as 20% of the world’s population may no longer easily access 80% of the oil, as in prior decades. In particular, the disproportionate affluence of certain populations of relatively unproductive elderly people is subject to distribute more evenly to the vigorous, virile, and increasingly well-educated masses of the developing world.

 

As the technological infrastructures of the West are increasingly available worldwide, the regions of economic growth are rapidly shifting. The idea that consumption and debt equate to wealth is being challenged by the possibility that consumption and debt may actually diminish wealth.

 

Now, old patterns of investing and even old patterns of organizing one’s finances may be suddenly less popular. A decline in popularity correlates to a decline in demand and a decline in price.

 

So, it’s not that suburban retirees value their homes much less than they did years ago, but that the rest of the world is increasingly less attracted to those suburban homes. Price is a function not just of the owner’s values, but the of the entire marketplace of buyers and sellers. Further, as socialism and communism advance in many nations, the enforcement by governing operations of private property regulations is subject to shift to increasingly aggressive acquisitions of that same property by those governing operations, whether through taxes or otherwise.

 

US Treasury Building

US Treasury Building (Photo credit: Scorpions and Centaurs)

 

As certain government programs destabilize, if not the governments themselves, investors can flee to perceived safety. To date, that has been great for the US Treasury but not so good for Greece or Spain (or New Jersey). When governments have been selectively favoring a particular market with tax privileges or direct subsidies and guarantees, such as real estate in the US, an interruption of that favoritism can be financially disastrous to the baby boomers who have been disproportionately benefiting from those interventions and protections.

 

Those who have the curiosity and courage to face these obvious developments can be responsible for adapting to them prudently. Whenever something changes, some people may benefit more than others from that change. If you are interested in exploring practical personal adjustments that you can make to be among those who receive the benefits of the vast emerging changes, I request that you contact me immediately.

 

In early 2003, J.R. began publishing warnings about an emerging global credit crisis and an eventual sharp decline in US Real Estate. In 2004 and 2005, he focused his publications on the future of rising oil prices, also pinpointing the top of the stock prices of the US Housing Sector (which has since fallen nearly 70%). In 2006, he produced triple-digit gains gains by trading the waves of metals. In 2007, he re-emphasized his warnings about US Real Estate, reporting the 15% decline in Phoenix, AZ median list prices (which were down 37% as of 9/2008 and kept falling). Throughout 2008, he issued warnings about the predictable consequences of the retiring of the first wave of the baby boom, including a final spike in prices of metals and oil, and the sequence of events that could follow that, including certain political “antics.” In early 2009, he forecast a “multi-month” rebound in US stocks and most global stocks, which, as of early 2010, has completed.